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Abstract
In this paper we study an entrants incentives to build a network infrastructure, when there is
an initial phase of service-based competition where it leases access to the incumbents infrastruc-
ture. We build a model in which the phase of service-based competition allows the entrant to
step into the market by progressively acquiring market experience. We show that the acquisition
of experience in the phase of service-based competition delays the entrants investment when
the prospects for infrastructure investment are good, and accelerates investment otherwise. We
also show that when the acquisition of experience depends on the entrants current customer
base and facility-based entry is a long-term possibility, setting a low access price can accelerate
the entrants investment.
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1 Introduction
In the telecommunications industry, many policy makers view achieving facility-based competition
(when new entrants rely on their own infrastructure to compete with the incumbent) as the long-
term goal. If competition is to function fully, it is indeed necessary for each operator to control its
supply chain to the largest possible extent. Larger benets in terms of new products and services
can moreover be expected under this form of competition than under service-based competition
(where new entrants rely on the incumbents infrastructure to provide services to end consumers).
However, as the deployment of new infrastructures involves large sunk costs, potential entrants are
rarely able to build their own facilities from the outset. This is why a large majority of national
regulatory authorities have mandated incumbents to o¤er access to their networks to new entrants,
so that service-based competition can develop rapidly.1
Although service-based competition is clearly benecial in the short term, its longer-term e¤ects
on facility-based competition have generated extensive debates. On the one hand, a traditional view
is that there is a conict between these two forms of competition. Indeed, a phase of service-based
competition introduces an opportunity cost of building an alternative infrastructure, and hence
lowers the entrants investment incentives. We refer to this e¤ect as the replacement e¤ect. On
the other hand, others have argued that a phase of service-based competition allows entrants to step
into the market and to acquire market experience progressively, which eventually enhances their
investment incentives. In other words, service-based competition and facility-based competition
are complements rather than substitutes in promoting competition. We refer to the e¤ect of
market experience acquisition on investment incentives as the stepping stone e¤ect.
An important assumption from the ladder of investment approach2 is that the stepping stone
e¤ect facilitates investment. That is, given that the replacement e¤ect is neutralized, service-based
and facility-based competition are complements.3 In this paper we propose a model in which an
entrant acquires market experience progressively as it operates in the market. We then study the
impact of a phase of service-based competition, and more specically of the stepping stone e¤ect,
on facility-based entry.
1For example, in the broadband market, unbundling of the local loop (i.e., regulated access to the incumbents
copper local loop) has become mandatory in most industrialized countries. Recently, the European Commission also
issued a Recommendation requiring some kind of regulated access to next generation access (bre) networks (EU,
2010).
2See Cave (2006). This approach is often referred to as the stepping stone argument in the US.
3As Bourreau et al. (2010) argue, the second assumption behind the ladder of investment approach is that the
regulator has the instruments to neutralize the replacement e¤ect.
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We consider two rms, an incumbent and a potential entrant. The entrant can enter the market
either by acquiring access to the incumbents facilities (which gives rise to service-based compe-
tition) and/or by building its own infrastructure (which gives rise to facility-based competition).
The access price to the incumbents infrastructure is exogenous and set by the regulator. We also
assume that the investment cost declines over time and that it is not viable to invest at the out-
set; therefore, the entrant has to wait before installing its own infrastructure. When it enters the
market, on the basis of either services or facilities, the entrant begins to acquire market experience.
In our setting, market experience encompasses di¤erent phenomenons. For example, consumers
could initially perceive the entrants service quality as low, but this perceived quality could increase
over time as the entrant operates in the market. Prior to entry, consumers might also be unaware of
the existence of the entrant. Once the entrant has entered the market, the proportion of informed
consumers could gradually increase over time, allowing the entrant to build a customer base.
We begin by studying a baseline case where the acquisition of experience depends only on the
time spent in the market. We show that the stepping stone e¤ect a¤ects investment incentives
in two opposite ways. On the one hand, as it has accumulated experience during the phase of
service-based competition, the entrant anticipates higher prots under facility-based competition,
which incentivizes investment. On the other, the entrant may benet from prolonging the phase of
service-based competition to acquire more experience, and gain higher prots under facility-based
competition, which tends to delay investment. When facility-based entry is a long-term perspective,
the former e¤ect dominates and the stepping stone e¤ect accelerates investment. Otherwise, if
facility-based entry is a short-term possibility, the latter e¤ect is the strongest and the stepping
stone e¤ect delays the entrants investment. In other words, taking the replacement e¤ect as given,
a process of market experience acquisition does not necessarily make service-based competition and
facility-based competition complements.
We then show that if facility-based entry is possible in the short-term, the phase of service-
based competition delays facility-based entry, compared to a benchmark without access. However,
if facility-based entry is a long-term possibility and experience has a strong impact on the entrants
prots, the phase of service-based competition accelerates facility-based entry. In this case only,
service-based competition facilitates facility-based entry per se.
In this baseline model, since the acquisition of experience depends only on the time spent in the
market, increasing the access price always accelerates investment. When it sets the access price, the
regulator therefore faces a standard trade-o¤ between static e¢ciency and investment incentives.
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We also study the case where the acquisition of market experience depends on the entrants
current customer base, within a specic model of Cournot competition with quality di¤erentiation.
If facility-based entry is a short-term possibility, we obtain the same result than in the baseline
case: increasing the access price accelerates investment. However, if facility-based entry is a long-
term possibility, a low access price accelerates investment, because it allows the entrant to acquire
experience rapidly due to a learning-by-doing e¤ect. In this case, the regulator can achieve both
static e¢ciency and early investment via a low access price.
Our paper is related to the literature on access and investment (see Cambini and Jiang (2009)
for a recent comprehensive survey).4 Bourreau and Do¼gan (2005 and 2006) analyze the e¤ect of
access to an incumbents infrastructure on an entrants incentives to build a network. Gans (2001)
and (2007), Hori and Mizuno (2006), and Vareda and Hoernig (2010) study the impact of access
obligations in investment races between ex-ante symmetric rms. However, these papers do not
consider any potential positive impact of the phase of service-based competition on the incentives
to enter on the basis of facilities. Therefore, they cannot account for any stepping stone e¤ect.
A few papers consider a possible complementarity between the phases of service-based and
facility-based competition. Vareda (2010) studies a two-period model, where the entrant learns
about the state of demand once it enters the market. Therefore, service-based competition in the
rst period resolves the uncertainty about demand, after which the entrant decides whether or not
to build its infrastructure. Schutz and Tregouët (2008) build a model that follows the same logic
but where the entrant is uncertain about its marginal cost. In these two papers, the resolution of
uncertainty can be either good news or bad news for infrastructure investment. In our model, on
the other hand, the phase of service-based competition always makes the entrant stronger, by
allowing it to acquire more experience. We show that even in this case, the stepping stone e¤ect
can contribute to delaying the entrants investment.
Avenali et al. (2010) also study a setting where an entrant can acquire experience under service-
based competition.5 Experience transforms into a (perceived) high quality only if the entrant invests
in its own facilities. Since they also assume that facility-based entry can take place only if the
entrants perceived quality is high, it follows that service-based entry is a necessary prerequisite for
facility-based entry. By contrast, in our setting, more experience always transforms into a higher
quality, whatever the entrants current technology (service-based or facility-based). Therefore,
4See also Valletti (2003) and Guthrie (2006).
5Experience acquisition is exogenous in their setting.
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service-based entry is not necessary for facility-based entry. However, we show that the existence
of a process of experience acquisition is a necessary (but not su¢cient) condition for service-based
entry to improve the prospects for facility-based entry.
Finally, a number of empirical studies have looked at the relationship between service-based
competition and facility-based competition. Most (if not all) of them reject the ladder of invest-
ment or stepping stone hypothesis that this relation is positive (i.e., that the stepping stone e¤ect
dominates the replacement e¤ect).6 Our paper contributes to this literature by characterizing under
which conditions the stepping stone e¤ect might be e¤ective in accelerating facility-based entry.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we outline the model. In Section 3
we solve for the equilibrium when the acquisition of experience depends only on the time spent in
the market. In Section 4 we study the case in which the entrants acquisition of experience depends
also on its current sales. In the last section we conclude.
2 The Model
We consider two rms, an incumbent operator (rm I), who owns a network infrastructure, and
a potential entrant (rm E). The entrant can enter the market either (i) by leasing access to the
incumbents infrastructure at the access price r  0 (which leads to service-based competition),
or (ii) by building its own network infrastructure (which leads to facility-based competition).
The access price is exogenous and set by the regulator.
Time is continuous, and the horizon is innite. We denote by t the date at which the entrant
enters the market for the rst time (on the basis of either services or facilities), and by T its date
of facility-based entry. If the entrant does not enter on the basis of services prior to building its
infrastructure, the two dates coincide, i.e., t = T . Otherwise, we have t < T . Finally, at each time
x  t, we denote by   x  t the time the entrant has spent in the market since it rst entered.
Market experience. When it enters the market, the entrant has a low level of market experi-
ence, where experience can correspond to the rms service quality or reputation. It then starts
accumulating experience, and at some point of time its level of experience reaches a maximum
6See, for example, Hazlett and Bazelon (2005) and Hausman and Sidak (2005) for the US, and Crandall and
Sidak (2007) and Bacache et al. (2013) for Europe. The only exception is the study by Distaso et al. (2009), who
analyze graphically the relation between access prices and the development of alternative broadband infrastructures
in Europe, and conclude that national regulatory authorities have adopted policies that are consistent with the ladder
of investment approach.
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and then remains constant.7 Formally, we assume that the entrants market experience, , evolves
according to the following process:
d
d
=
8<
: + qE if  < 0 if    , (1)
where  > 0 and   0 are parameters, qE is the entrants current production level, and  its
long-run level of experience. Without loss of generality, we assume that  (0) = 0.
With this formulation, the acquisition of market experience depends on the time the entrant
has spent in the market via the parameter , and on the entrants customer base via the parameter
, which generates a learning-by-doing e¤ect: the entrant acquires market experience at a faster
pace if its current customer base is larger.8 The entrants market experience increases until it
reaches the threshold level,  = .
Finally, we assume that the process of market experience acquisition, which is given by (1),
is the same under service-based and facility-based competition. However, we will show in Section
4 that when the learning-by-doing e¤ect is operational, in equilibrium experience acquisition goes
faster under facility-based competition, because the entrant has a larger customer base under this
mode of competition than under service-based competition.9
To start with, we study a baseline model in which there is no learning-by-doing e¤ect for
the acquisition of experience. This assumption allows us to clearly identify the main e¤ects at
play within a highly stylized model, where strategic interactions are limited. It can be relevant,
for example, if the word that the entrant is a good-quality provider spreads among all potential
consumers, and not only among the entrants consumers, or if the quality of the entrant is initially
lower because it has to make deals with equipment suppliers, content providers, etc., which takes
time, but is unrelated to its current customer base. We therefore state the following assumption.
Assumption 1.  does not depend on the entrants customer base, i.e.,  = 0.
Under Assumption 1, since  (0) = 0, the entrants experience is given by  () = min

; 
	
.
7The entrants long-run level of experience could be equal to the incumbents level, in which case the entrant
competes on a level-playing eld with the incumbent (except for the access charge that it has to pay). It could also
correspond to a lower or higher level of experience than that of the incumbent.
8 For example, Cave (2006) argues that in the telecommunications industry, new entrants investments depend
on their current revenues and/or their current customer base.
9Assuming that the acquisition of experience goes faster under facility-based competition, because for example
the entrant controls its own infrastructure, would reinforce this asymmetry.
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Since the entrants experience depends only on the time spent in the market, , no rm can inuence
the process of market share acquisition through its retail strategy (price, quantity). However, note
that  () is endogenous to the entrants entry decisions.
In Section 4, we will relax Assumption 1, and consider the (perhaps more realistic) case where
the acquisition of market experience depends also on the entrants current customer base.
Prot ows. At any time, the industry structure is characterized by either monopoly, service-
based competition or facility-based competition. We denote by ji the prot ow of rm i = I; E,
where j = M;F; S stand for monopoly, facility-based competition and service-based competition,
respectively. We assume that the entrant receives a prot ow of 0 when it remains outside the
market. The net discounted prot of rm i = I; E is denoted by i, and  > 0 represents the
discount factor.
We assume that prot ows are continuous with respect to , and we denote by E (; r) =
FE ()  
S
E (; r) the entrants prot incentive to switch from service-based to facility-based com-
petition.
Assumption 2. The prot ows are characterized by the following:
(i) For all r  0 and   0, @SE ( () ; r) =@r  0.
(ii) For all r  0 and   0, SE ( () ; r)  0, and 
S
E ( () ; r)  
F
E ( ()).
(iii) For all r  0 and   0, @jE () =@  0 for j = F; S and @E (; r) =@  0.
Assumption 2(i) means that a higher access price (weakly) hurts the entrant. This is due to the
fact that a higher access price implies a higher perceived marginal cost for the entrant. Assump-
tion 2(ii) implies that the entrant prefers service-based competition to staying out of the market,
and that it prefers facility-based competition to service-based competition. Indeed, its perceived
marginal cost is higher under service-based competition than under facility-based competition, due
to the access price. Moreover, possibilities of di¤erentiation might be greater under facility-based
competition, or the entrant might install a more e¢cient technology when building its own in-
frastructure.10 Assumption 2(iii) states that the entrants prot and its incentive to switch from
10Note that if the entrant always prefers service-based competition to facility-based competition, facility-based
entry never occurs. Since we are interested in the date of facility-based entry, we do not consider this possibility.
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service-based to facility-based competition increase with market experience.11
Finally, we assume that the entrant incurs no xed cost under service-based competition,12
and we normalize the marginal cost of access to zero. In Section 4 we provide an example of a
competitive setting that satises Assumptions 2(i)-(iii).
Investment cost. The cost of building a new infrastructure at date T , discounted at time 0, is
denoted by C(T ). We make the following assumptions on C ():
Assumption 3.
(i) C 0(T )  0, C 00(T )  0, and lim
T!1
C(T ) = C  0:
(ii) C(0) is su¢ciently large so that facility-based entry never happens at T = 0.
(iii) C is su¢ciently small so that the entrant always ends up building its infrastructure.
The cost of building a network infrastructure declines over time due to technological progress.
Since we are interested in studying how the entrants decision to build an infrastructure is a¤ected
by the terms of service-based competition and by market experience, we assume away immediate
facility-based entry with Assumption 3(ii), and we ignore the case where facility-based entry never
occurs with Assumption 3(iii).13 Finally, we assume that C () is su¢ciently convex so that the
second-order conditions of prot maximization with respect to the investment date hold.
Timing of the game. The timing of the game is as follows: given r  0, the access price set by
the regulator, at each moment of time the entrant decides whether to stay out of the market, to
lease access to the incumbents infrastructure, or to build its own infrastructure.
With this timing, we consider that the regulator is able to commit to an access price,14 which is
11Assumption 2(iii) implies that the entrants incentive to switch from service-based to facility-based competition
is higher in the long run than at the date of entry.
12 In reality, entrants might incur positive entry costs. For example, in the telecommunications industry, with local
loop unbundling, there are xed costs due to co-location and order handling. However, these costs are negligible when
compared to the cost of building a new infrastructure.
13For larger values of C, there might be equilibria where the entrant never rolls out its infrastructure. However,
our focus is on how the timing of facility-based entry is a¤ected by a phase of service-based competition and a process
of market experience acquisition. We therefore assume that facility-based entry always occurs in equilibrium. Note
also that in our setting an extremely late date of facility-based entry is equivalent to no facility-based entry.
14 In our setting there is no commitment problem per se. Once the entrant has invested, there is no point for the
regulator to renege on its commitment by setting a low access charge, because the entrant will always be better o¤
using its own infrastructure. This is due to the fact that investment is zero/one in our setting and that there is only
one entrant. As Avenali et al. (2010) show, a commitment issue would arise if we were considering a second entrant.
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linear and constant over time.15 Since our focus is how the acquisition of market experience a¤ects
the timing of the entrants investment, we also ignore a possible reaction from the incumbent to
the entry threat.16
3 The Equilibrium
In this section we rst determine the equilibrium date of facility-based entry in a benchmark
situation without access to the incumbents infrastructure. We refer to this benchmark case with
the superscript na (no access). Then, we study the entrants entry strategy when it leases access
to the incumbents infrastructure, and refer to this case with the superscript a (access). Finally,
we compare the investment date with access and without access, and briey discuss the regulators
choice of the access price.
3.1 A benchmark: no access
To analyze the e¤ect of access on the entrants investment strategy, we start by studying a bench-
mark where access is not a possibility.17 Therefore, the entrant can enter only by building its own
infrastructure. It then chooses its investment date, T , to maximize its discounted prot,
naE (T ) =
Z 1
T
e xFE ( (x  T )) dx  C (T ) . (2)
Note that at some moment of time, the entrant has reached its maximum level of experience, and
does not accumulate experience anymore (i.e.,  = ).
Assuming that naE (T ) is concave in T ,
18 the optimal investment date, Tna, satises the fol-
lowing rst-order condition,
 FE ( (0)) e
 Tna +
Z 1
Tna
e x
dFE ( (x  T
na))
dT
dx = C 0 (Tna) . (3)
Equation (3) can be interpreted as follows. The entrant equates its marginal discounted facility-
15We abstract from the optimal regulation of the access price, which would involve setting a more sophisticated
access scheme, e.g. a time-dependent access price, as studied by Bourreau and Do¼gan (2006) or in our working paper
version, Bourreau and Drouard (2010).
16Bourreau and Do¼gan (2005 and 2006) study the incumbents reaction to the entry threat when it can set the
access price to its infrastructure. See also Section 4 where we discuss to which extent the incumbent could inuence
the entrants acquisition of experience.
17For example, the regulator may have banned access.
18This is true if the investment cost is su¢ciently convex. See Appendix A.
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based revenues with its marginal investment cost. At a given date T , if its marginal investment
cost is higher than its marginal revenue, its optimal decision is to wait. If the entrant waits for
a period dT , since the investment cost decreases over time, it reduces its investment cost by an
amount C 0(T )dT , but it also forgoes some revenues. These foregone revenues are composed of two
parts. First, the entrant gives up some facility-based prots during the period dT ; this corresponds
to the term FE ( (0)) e
 TdT in Equation (3). Second, the entrant does not accumulate market
experience during the period dT , which decreases its future facility-based discounted prots; this
corresponds to the second term,
R1
T e
 x d
F
E
((x T ))
dT dx

dT . Note that this term disappears if 
is constant, that is, if there is no progressive acquisition of market experience for the entrant.
Finally, since we have C 00  0 under Assumption 3(i), the optimal investment date Tna is
lower for a higher FE ; a higher prot ow from facility-based competition implies an earlier date
of facility-based entry. Moreover, as FE increases with  from Assumption 2(iii), T
na is lower for a
higher 0 (i.e., a higher ). That is, if the entrant acquires market experience more rapidly, it will
invest earlier.
Replacing for  = x  T in (2), the rst-order condition (3) can be rewritten as
 e T
na
Z 1
0
e FE ( ()) d   C
0 (Tna) = 0. (4)
From Equation (4), we see that the fact that the entrant acquires market experience progressively
delays facility-based competition, because it lowers discounted prots. One natural idea is then
to provide some transitory entry assistance to new entrants by introducing an initial phase of
service-based competition. We study the impact of such an entry-assisting policy in the next
subsection.
3.2 Investment decision with a phase of service-based competition
When access is a possibility, at the beginning of time, a dominant strategy for the entrant is to
request access to the incumbents infrastructure, as it earns positive prots under service-based
competition under Assumption 2(ii), and immediate facility-based entry is not viable under As-
sumption 3(ii). Therefore, the entrant enters the market on the basis of services at t = 0.19 Provided
19The process of experience acquisition has therefore no inuence on the date of service-based entry. This result
hinges in particular on our assumption that there is no xed cost for service-based entry.
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that it invests at date T in its own infrastructure, the entrants discounted prot is
aE (T ) =
Z T
0
e xSE ( (x) ; r) dx+
Z 1
T
e xFE ( (x)) dx  C(T ).
From date 0 to date T , the entrant competes on the basis of services with the incumbent and
accumulates market experience. From date T on, the entrant competes on the basis of facilities
and continues accumulating experience (until it reaches the threshold level of experience).
We assume that aE (T ) is concave in T .
20 The optimal facility-based entry date, T a, then
satises the following rst-order condition,
 

FE ( (T
a))  SE ( (T
a) ; r)

e T
a
  C 0(T a) = 0. (5)
The rst-order condition (5) shows that the higher the service-based prot ow, SE , the later the
facility-based entry date, T a. This is because the service-based prot ow represents an opportunity
cost of facility-based entry for the entrant. This corresponds to a replacement e¤ect, very similar
to the one considered in the licensing literature.21
Since E (; r) increases with  under Assumption 2(iii), the higher 
0 (i.e., the higher ), the
earlier the investment date, T a. In other words, if the entrant acquires market experience faster,
facility-based entry takes place earlier.
3.3 The impact of service-based competition on facility-based entry
To compare the dates of facility-based entry with and without a phase of service-based competition,
we compare the rst-order conditions (4) and (5). The rst-order condition with a phase of service-
based competition is given by (5), and it can be rewritten as FOCa (T a) = 0, where FOCa (T ) =
 

FE ( (T ))  
S
E ( (T ) ; r)

e T  C 0(T ). Similarly, the rst-order condition in the benchmark,
which is given by (4), can be written as FOCna (Tna) = 0. To compare the dates of facility-based
20This is true if the investment cost is su¢ciently convex. See Appendix B.
21See, for example, Gallini (1984); the incumbent rms reduce the entrants incentives to innovate by licensing
their technologies. In the literature on access and investment, the existence of a replacement e¤ect has already been
pointed out by many studies (e.g., see Hori and Mizuno (2006), Vareda and Hoernig (2010), and Bourreau and Do¼gan
(2005, 2006)).
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entry with and without access, using (4) and (5), we rewrite FOCa as follows:
FOCa (T ) = FOCna (T ) + SE ( (T ) ; r) e
 T| {z }
(I)
+(T )| {z }
(II)
, (6)
where
 (T ) = e T
Z 1
0
e x
 
FE ( (x))  
F
E ( (T ))

dx.
Given that aE (T ) and 
na
E (T ) are concave, the date of facility-based entry is later with a phase
of service-based entry than without such a phase if and only if FOCa (Tna) > FOCna (Tna) = 0.
Whether FOCa (Tna) > 0 or FOCa (Tna) < 0 depends on the sign of the sum of term (I) and
term (II) in Equation (6), for T = Tna. Term (I) represents the replacement e¤ect, that we have
discussed earlier. It is positive for all T , and therefore it tends to delay facility-based entry. The
second term,  (T ), represents the e¤ect of the entrants acquisition of experience during the phase
of service-based competition on its incentives to invest in a network infrastructure. Indeed, if the
entrants experience is immediately at its maximum when it enters the market, this e¤ect is absent,
as we have  (T ) = 0, for all T , if  is constant. We therefore refer to this e¤ect as the stepping
stone e¤ect. The stepping stone e¤ect accelerates facility-based entry if  (T ) is negative, and
delays facility-based entry otherwise.22
Intuitively, one could expect that since the stepping stone e¤ect makes the entrant stronger, it
tends to accelerate investment. However, with the following Proposition, we show that a progressive
accumulation of experience under service-based competition can in some cases delay the entrants
investment, compared to the benchmark.
Proposition 1 If the date of facility-based entry without access is su¢ciently low, the stepping
stone e¤ect delays facility-based entry, relative to the benchmark. Otherwise, it accelerates facility-
based entry.
Proof. The sign of  (T ) is the same as the sign of A (T ), where
A (T ) 
Z T
0
e x
 
FE ( (x))  
F
E ( (T ))

dx+
Z 1
T
e x
 
FE ( (x))  
F
E ( (T ))

dx.
22Note that the process of experience acquisition also a¤ects investment incentives through current service-based
competition prots, but that it is incorporated in the replacement e¤ect, which depends on the current level of
experience, (T ).
12
Since FE () increases with  under Assumption 2(iii) and 
0 > 0, we have
dA (T )
dT
=  
0 (T )

@FE
@
( (T ))  0.
In addition, we have lim
T!0
A (T ) > 0 and lim
T!1
A (T ) < 0. Therefore, A (T ) is positive for low values
of T , and negative otherwise. Since the sign of  (T ) is the same as the sign of A (T ), it follows
that there is a threshold eT such that  (T )  0 for all T  eT , and  (T )  0 otherwise.
This result highlights that the stepping stone e¤ect impacts facility-based entry in two opposite
ways. On the one hand, as it has acquired experience during the phase of service-based competition,
the entrant expects higher prots under facility-based competition. On the other, the entrant may
benet from prolonging the phase of service-based competition to acquire more experience, and
thereby gain higher prots in the future under facility-based competition.
The rst e¤ect gives an incentive to invest earlier than in the benchmark, whereas the second
e¤ect gives an incentive to invest later. When the date of facility-based entry is likely to be early,
the magnitude of the rst e¤ect is very small, as the entrant has not yet acquired much experience.
Hence, the second e¤ect dominates and the stepping stone e¤ect delays facility-based entry. On the
other hand, if the date of facility-based entry is likely to be late, the magnitude of the rst e¤ect is
high and it dominates the second e¤ect. The stepping stone then accelerates facility-based entry.
To identify these two opposite e¤ects formally, we rewrite  (T ) as follows,
 (T ) =

FE ( (0))  
F
E ( (T ))

e T  
Z 1
T
e x
d
dT
FE ( (x  T )) dx: (7)
Now, consider that the entrant decides to delay its investment from date T to date T + dT . The
stepping stone e¤ect is a¤ected as follows. First, the entrant will not capture the gains associated
with the stepping stone e¤ect during the period dT . Compared to the no-access benchmark, the
entrant will forgo some additional prot,

FE ( (0))  
F
E ( (T ))

e TdT , which corresponds to
the rst term in (7) and to our rst positive e¤ect. Second, during this period dT , the entrant is
going to acquire more experience. Therefore, after the period, the gains associated with a higher
level of market experience will be greater for the rest of time. This corresponds to the second term
in (7) and to the second negative e¤ect.
If the stepping stone e¤ect delays the entrants investment, both the stepping stone e¤ect and the
replacement e¤ect tend to delay facility-based entry. In this case, service-based competition retards
facility-based competition. However, if the stepping stone e¤ect tends to accelerate investment, a
13
relevant question is whether a phase of service-based competition can accelerate facility-based
entry per se, that is, without a regulation aimed at neutralizing the replacement e¤ect. We have
the following result.
Proposition 2 If the date of facility-based entry without access is su¢ciently early, a phase of
service-based competition delays facility-based entry. If the date of facility-based entry without access
is late, a necessary condition for the phase of service-based competition to accelerate investment is
that
FE
 


  FE ( (0)) > 
S
E
 
; r

: (8)
Proof. Equation (6) can be rewritten as
FOCa (T ) = FOCna (T ) + e T

SE ( (T ) ; r)  
F
E ( (T )) + 
Z 1
0
e x
 
FE ( (x))

dx

.
This equation shows that the e¤ect of a phase of service-based competition on the date of facility-
based entry depends on the sign of B (Tna), where
B (T )  SE ( (T ) ; r)  
F
E ( (T )) + 
Z 1
0
e x
 
FE ( (x))

dx.
From Assumption 2(iii), B (T ) decreases with T . Since 0 > 0 and SE  0 from Assumption 2(ii),
we also have
lim
T!0
B (T ) = 
Z 1
0
e x

FE ( (x))  
F
E ( (0))

dx+ SE ( (0) ; r) > 0,
which proves the rst statement of the Proposition.
As B (T ) decreases with T , a phase of service-based competition is more likely to accelerate
investment if T is high. At the extreme, when T !1, we have
lim
T!1
B (T ) = 
Z 1
0
e xK (x) dx,
where K (x)  FE ( (x)) E
 
; r

. From Assumption 2(iii) and since 0 > 0, we have @K=@x 
0. Since limx!1K (x) > 0, K (x) is positive for high values of x. Therefore, for limT!1B (T ) <
0 to be true, K (x) must be negative for some values of x, and in particular for x = 0. In
sum, a necessary condition for service-based competition to accelerate facility-based entry is that
FE ( (0)) < E
 
; r

, that is, FE
 


  FE ( (0)) > 
S
E
 
; r

.
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When there is no experience acquisition (i.e.,  is constant), service-based competition always
delays facility-based entry. Experience acquisition is therefore a necessary condition for service-
based competition to improve the prospects of facility-based entry. Proposition 2 however shows
that when the date of facility-based entry without access is early, the phase of service-based compe-
tition retards investment, even though the entrant can acquire experience during this phase. If the
prospects of facility-based entry are very weak, the phase of access-based competition can in some
specic cases accelerate the entrants infrastructure development. This is true only if Condition (8)
holds. This condition states that the gains from the acquisition of experience, in terms of higher
facility-based prots, should be su¢ciently high, compared to the opportunity cost of facility-based
entry (i.e., lost prots from service-based competition).
To summarize, service-based competition is not likely to facilitate facility-based entry per se,
except in specic cases where investment is a long-term prospect and experience acquisition has a
very strong impact on the entrants facility-based prots.
3.4 The impact of the access price on investment and welfare
Finally, we briey discuss the regulators choice of the access price, r. The regulator maximizes the
discounted social welfare, which is dened as the sum of discounted consumer surplus and industry
prots. Since  does not depend on r, the regulator cannot a¤ect the entrants acquisition of
experience through the access price (e.g., by setting a low access price). However, as the magnitude
of the replacement e¤ect decreases with r, the regulator can accelerate facility-based entry by
increasing the access price.
The regulator therefore faces the standard trade-o¤ between setting a low access price to max-
imize welfare ows under service-based competition, and setting a high access price to accelerate
facility-based entry. As shown by Avenali et al. (2010) and Bourreau and Do¼gan (2006), this trade
o¤ can be alleviated by setting an access price that increases over time.23
4 Market Experience and Customer Base
So far, we have assumed that market experience depended only on the time spent in the market
(i.e.,  = 0 in Equation (1)). In this section we study the case where the acquisition of experience
23See also our working paper version, Bourreau and Drouard (2010), where we discuss the optimal time-dependent
access price in the present setting.
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depends also on the entrants customer base (i.e.,  > 0). We adopt the competitive setting of
quantity competition with quality di¤erentiation from Katz and Shapiro (1985),24 and interpret
the entrants experience as its level of quality. Our main result in that in contrast to the baseline
model (see Section 3.4), decreasing the access price can accelerate facility-based entry if facility-
based entry is only a long-term possibility.
In what follows, we begin by presenting the competitive setting. Then, we study the entrants
investment decision. Finally, we study the relation between the access price and the date of facility-
based entry.
4.1 The competitive setting
We consider a unit mass of consumers, who decide at each moment of time whether to subscribe
to rm I or to rm E, or not to subscribe to any of these rms.25 Consumers have no switching
cost, and therefore their choice of a supplier at a given period of time does not a¤ect their choices
at subsequent periods.26
The indirect utility of a consumer of type  is U = +i pi, where i and pi denote the quality
and price of rm i, respectively, with i = I; E. As we will assume below that rms maximize their
current prots when setting quantities, we drop all time index. Consumers types are uniformly
distributed over [0; 1]. We consider that the entrants quality corresponds to its market experience
(i.e., E = ), and that it evolves according to the process given by Equation (1), with  > 0. We
assume that I < 1, that r 2 [0; (1  I) =2] and that
 < 1 + 2I . The upper bounds for I and
r imply that rm E has a positive demand in equilibrium, even if its quality is equal to zero. The
upper bound for  ensures that rm I is active in equilibrium under facility-based competition.
Finally, rms have constant marginal production costs that we normalize to zero.
If rm I and rm E are both active in the market, their quality-adjusted prices are necessarily
the same, that is, we have pI   I = pE   E = ep. The marginal consumer is dened by  = ep,
24The assumption of quantity competition seems reasonable to describe competition in telecommunications mar-
kets, where rms face capacity constraints. It has also been adopted by other authors, such as Foros (2004) and
Nitsche and Wiethaus (2011).
25Since consumers make repeat purchases/subscriptions, there is always the same mass of potential consumers
at each moment of time. This would not be true with the adoption of a durable good. The consumers who would
purchase the durable good at a given period of time would exit the market, reducing the mass of potential adopters
in subsequent periods. Additional e¤ects would then arise, a¤ecting the consumers decision of an adoption time.
For example, to the extent that the quality of the good increases with the entrants experience, a consumer would
have an incentive to wait for the entrant to become more experienced to purchase a higher quality durable good. We
thank a referee for suggesting us this idea of future research.
26Consumers are also too small to inuence the market outcome (e.g., the accumulation of experience).
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hence, from the uniform distribution assumption, the total demand is Q = qI + qE = 1  ep. Firm
i = I; E then faces the inverse demand function pi = 1  (qI + qE) + i.
Firms compete in quantities, and to simplify the analysis, we assume that they maximize their
current prot ows, i.e., they are myopic. If rms were not myopic, the entrant would internalize
the process of experience acquisition and set a higher quantity. However, the incumbent would not
be able to inuence the entrants learning-by-doing process, because when it sets the quantity that
maximizes its prot, the incumbent takes the entrants quantity as given.27
This is a consequence of our assumption of quantity competition, and it would be di¤erent
under price competition. More generally, the incumbent might use some strategy to inuence the
entrants experience acquisition (e.g., by investing in quality).28 We ignore such strategies here.
Solving for the (short-run) Nash equilibrium, we obtain the prot ows under service-based and
facility-based competition. Under servicebased competition, the equilibrium prot ows are
SI (; r) =
(1 + 2I   )
2
9
+
(5  5r + I + 4)
9
r, and SE (; r) =
(1 + 2  I   2r)
2
9
. (9)
Under facility-based competition, the equilibrium prot ows are
FI () =
(1 + 2I   )
2
9
, and FE () =
(1 + 2  I)
2
9
.
It can easily be checked that Assumptions 2(i)-(iii) are satised.
In the equilibrium of the quantity setting subgame, we have qE = (1 + 2  I   2r) =3 under
service-based competition, and qE = (1 + 2  I) =3 under facility-based competition. The solu-
tion of the di¤erential equation (1) is then as follows. If access is not a possibility, since  (0) = 0,
the entrants quality of service is given by
 () = na () = min
n
 + (1  I)

e(2)=3   1

=2; 
o
. (10)
27To understand how the game would be a¤ected if rms were making dynamic quantity choices, rst assume that
the entrant is myopic, but that the incumbent is not. Since the incumbent takes the entrants current quantity as given
when its sets its own quantity and the learning-by-doing process is only a¤ected by rm Es current production, the
incumbent cannot inuence the entrants process of experience acquisition through its quantity decision. Therefore,
the two rms produce the short-run equilibrium quantities as if they were both myopic. Second, assume that the
incumbent is myopic, but that the entrant is not. The entrant then internalizes the experience acquisition process
in its quantity decision, and we have a learning-by-doing e¤ect: the entrant produces a higher quantity, and since
quantities are strategic substitutes, the incumbent produces less than in the short-run equilibrium.
28To extent that the incumbent prefers service-based competition over facility-based competition (because it earns
wholesale prots under the former form of competition), it would have an incentive to slow down the entrants
acquisition of experience to retard facility-based entry.
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That is, the entrants quality of service increases as it spends time in the market, until it reaches
the threshold level, .
We now consider the case where access is a possibility. To simplify the analysis, we assume that
the entrant reaches its maximum level of experience in the phase of facility-based competition.29 If
service-based competition starts at date 0 and facility-based entry occurs at date T , at date x the
entrants quality of service is
 () = a (x; T; r) =
8<
: 
a
S (x; r) if 0  x  T
aF (x; T; r) if x > T
,
where
aS (x; r) = x+ (1  I   2r)

e2x=3   1

=2,
and30
aF (x; T; r) = min
n
x+ (1  I)

e2x=3   1

=2  r

e2x=3   e2(x T )=3

; 
o
.
As a (x; T; r) decreases with r, a low access price allows the entrant to acquire market experience
more rapidly. Moreover, if r > 0, the entrant acquires experience at a slower pace under service-
based competition than under facility-based competition, because its customer base is smaller under
the former form of competition than under the latter.
4.2 The entrants investment decision
When there is no phase of service-based competition, the entrants optimal investment date is given
by Equation (3), with  () = na (), where na () is given by Equation (10).
When access is a possibility, the entrant requests access to the incumbents infrastructure prior
to building its infrastructure, as leasing access is a dominant strategy for the entrant under Assump-
tions 2(ii) and 3(ii). Besides, as aF increases with x and goes to innity when x goes to innity,
there exists a date x (T; r) such that aF (x; T; r) =
 if and only if x  x (T; r).31 Therefore, the
29This is done without loss of generality.
30To determine a
F
(x; T; r), we use the fact that a (x; T; r) is continuous at x = T:
31Note that x (T; r)  T , as a
F
(x; T; r) is dened for x  T . To simplify the exposition, we drop the arguments
of x in the rest of the text.
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entrants discounted prot can be written as
aE (T ) =
Z T
0
e xSE (
a
S (x; r) ; r) dx+
Z x
T
e xFE (
a
F (x; T; r)) dx+
Z 1
x
e xFE
 


dx  C(T ).
This prot reads as follows. From date 0 to date T , the entrant requests access to the incumbents
infrastructure and accumulates market experience according to the process aS . From date T to
date x, there is facility-based competition, and the entrant continues accumulating experience, but
at a faster pace, given by aF . Finally, from date x on, the entrant has attained its maximum level
of experience, and competes on the basis of facilities.
Assuming that aE (T ) is concave in T ,
32 the optimal facility-based entry date, T a, satises the
rst-order condition,
 

FE (
a (T a; T a; r))  SE (
a (T a; T a; r) ; r)

e T
a
(11)
+
Z x
Ta
e x
d
dT
FE (
a
F (x; T
a; r)) dx| {z }
A
  C 0(T a) = 0,
since e x @x@T

FE (
a
F (x; T
a; r))  FE (I)

= 0, as FE (
a
F (x; T
a; r)) = FE (I).
Compared to the rst-order condition in our baseline model, given by (5), the rst-order con-
dition (11) contains an additional term that we denote by A. We nd that A is negative, as we
have ddT 
F
E (
a
F (x; T
a; r)) =
 
@FE=@

 (@aF =@T ), and @
F
E=@  0 and @
a
F =@T  0 for x  T .
Therefore, term A represents an incentive to enter on the basis of facilities at an early date. The
intuition is that the quantity produced during a given period is smaller under service-based com-
petition than under facility-based competition, as the entrant has to pay the access price under
service-based competition. Therefore, quality improvements go faster under facility-based compe-
tition than under service-based competition. It follows that if the entrant delays its facility-based
entry for a period dT , its quality improvements will be lower during this period, which a¤ects all
its future prot ows.
Since the rst-order condition (11) is di¤erent from its equivalent in the baseline model, we
reformulate the stepping stone e¤ect. As in Section 3, the rst-order condition with access can be
written as
FOCa (T ) = FOCna (T ) + SE (
a (T; T; r) ; r) e T + e (T ) ,
32This is true if C() is su¢ciently convex.
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where
e (T; r) = FE (na (0))  FE (a (T; T; r)) e T  
Z +T
T
e x
d
dT
FE (
na (x  T )) dx (12)
+
Z x
T
e x
d
dT
FE (
a
F (x; T; r)) dx,
and where  is dened as the solution of na () = , with  + T > x.
The rst two terms in (12) are similar to the two terms in Equation (7) of the baseline model.
Since a (T; T; r) > na (0) and FE () increases with , the rst term is negative, which tends to
accelerate facility-based entry. It represents the cost of staying under service-based competition
and not capturing the gains associated with experience acquisition. The second term corresponds
to the benet of remaining under service-based competition in terms of experience acquisition, and
it gives an incentive to invest later than in the benchmark. Finally, the last term in Expression
(12) was absent in the baseline model. This is the same term as in the rst-order condition (11).
As we have explained above, this term is negative, and it tends to accelerate facility-based entry.
The idea is that because the entrant acquires market experience more rapidly under facility-based
competition than under service-based competition, it now faces an opportunity cost of staying
under service-based competition in terms of (lower) market experience.
4.3 The relation between the access price and the date of facility-based entry
In contrast to our baseline model, an increase of the access price has an ambiguous e¤ect on the
equilibrium date of facility-based entry with access, which is dened by the rst-order condition
(11). First, the access price has a direct e¤ect on the investment date. If the level of experience a is
given and the access price r increases, the replacement e¤ect is reduced, as the entrant makes lower
prots under service-based competition. This direct e¤ect was present in our baseline model, and
it tends to accelerate facility-based entry. Second, the access price has two indirect e¤ects which
go through the entrants level of experience, and were absent in the baseline model. If the access
price increases, the entrants acquisition of experience slows down under service-based competition,
because the quantity produced by the entrant decreases. The entrants experience at a given date,
a, therefore decreases, which in turn a¤ects the rst two terms of Equation (11): (i) the entrants
prot incentive, E , decreases, which tends to delay facility-based entry;
33 (ii) term A, which
33Note that with another competition setting, this e¤ect will also be present, but that it might go in the opposite
direction, as E does not necessarily increase with 
a. For example, this is not true in the Hotelling setting that
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represents the loss in experience acquisition associated with waiting, can either increase or decrease.
Indeed, for a (x; T a; r) < I , we have
@
@r

@FE
@
@a
@T
(x; T a; r)

=  
8
27
e2(x T )=3

(1  I + 2
a (x; T a; r)) + 2r
@a
@r
(x; T a; r)

.
Since (1  I + 2
a (x; T a; r)) > 0 and @a=@r < 0, this expression can be either positive or
negative. Therefore, term A can either increase or decrease with r.
Interestingly enough, and in contrast to our baseline model, the stepping stone e¤ect now
depends on the access price, r. Using Equation (7) we nd that
@e (T; r)
@r
=  
@FE (
a (T; T; r))
@
@a (T; T; r)
@r
e T +
Z x
T
e x
@
@r
d
dT
FE (
a (x; T; r)) dx
+
@x
@r
d
dT
FE (
a
F (x (T; r) ; T; r)) e
 x.
The rst term is positive as @FE=@ > 0 and @
a=@r < 0, whereas the second and third terms can
be either positive or negative. Though we cannot determine the sign of @e (T; r) =@r analytically,
simulations suggest that when the access price r increases, the value of the stepping stone e¤ect is
reduced for low values of T and increased for high values of T .
Therefore, if the entrants optimal date of facility-based entry is early, increasing r will reduce
both the replacement e¤ect and the stepping stone e¤ect, which will in turn lead to an earlier
investment date. However, if the date of facility-based entry is late, increasing the access price
softens the replacement e¤ect but increases the value of the stepping stone e¤ect. In this case, a
higher access price might delay facility-based entry. We can then state the following Proposition.
Proposition 3 When the acquisition of market experience depends on the entrants customer base,
increasing the access price tends to accelerate the entrants investment, compared to the benchmark,
if facility-based entry is a short-term possibility, and to delay investment if facility-based entry is a
long-term possibility.
If facility-based entry is a short-term possibility, we obtain the same result than in the base-
line model: increasing the access price accelerates investment. The regulator therefore faces the
standard trade-o¤ between static e¢ciency and investment incentives, which it may solve with a
more sophisticated access price regulation. If facility-based entry is only a long-term possibility,
we developed in our working paper version, Bourreau and Drouard (2010).
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however, we obtain a di¤erent result. In this case, due to the learning-by-doing e¤ect, the regu-
lator can achieve both static e¢ciency and an early investment by setting a low access price. In
other words, service-based competition can facilitate facility-based entry per se, without the need
to implement a ne-tuned regulation.
As an illustration, we propose a numerical example with the following parameter values, I =
 = 0:75,  = 0:05,  = 0 and r = 0:1,34 and determine the overall impact of an increase of
the access price, r, when there is a phase of service-based competition. We dene RE (T; r) =
SE (
a (T; T; r) ; r) e T , which represents the replacement e¤ect. Note that @RE=@r < 0; that
is, a higher access price softens the replacement e¤ect. Figure 1 shows the impact of a marginal
increase of the access price on the date of facility-based entry, as a function of the strength of the
learning-by-doing e¤ect  (on the horizontal axis) and the date of facility-based entry with access
T a (on the vertical axis).
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Figure 1: Impact of a marginal increase of the access price on the replacement e¤ect and the
stepping stone e¤ect.
There are three zones in Figure 1. First, if the date of facility-based entry is below the dotted
line, an increase of the access price decreases the value of the stepping stone e¤ect. Second, if the
34Note that this value of r does not necessarily correspond to the socially optimal r.
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date of facility-based entry is above the dotted line and below the thick line, an increase of the
access price increases the value of the stepping stone e¤ect, but is not large enough to compensate
for the decrease of the replacement e¤ect. In these two zones, therefore, increasing the access price
accelerates facility-based entry, which corresponds to the standard result. Third, if the date of
facility-based entry is above the thick line, an increase of the access price increases the stepping
stone e¤ect, and the increase of the stepping stone e¤ect dominates the decrease of the replacement
e¤ect. Therefore, if the date of facility-based entry with access is su¢ciently high, an increase of
the access price delays facility-based entry, in contrast with our baseline model.
Finally, note that the replacement e¤ect and the stepping stone e¤ect vary with the learning-
by-doing parameter . Since the entrant accumulates experience at a faster pace when  increases,
the replacement e¤ect increases with , which tends to delay the date of facility-based entry. The
e¤ect of the learning-by-doing parameter on the stepping stone e¤ect is less clear-cut. On the one
hand, an increase in  raises the benets for the entrant from prolonging the phase of service-based
competition, in terms of higher prots under facility-based competition. On the other hand, the
opportunity cost in terms of lower market experience accumulation under service-based competi-
tion also increases . Simulations suggest that overall, the stepping stone e¤ect decreases (resp.,
increases) with  if facility-based entry is a long-term (resp., short term) possibility. Therefore,
when the date of facility-based entry without access is early, an increase in the learning-by-doing
parameter reinforces both the replacement e¤ect and the stepping stone e¤ect, and delays the date
of facility-based entry with access.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied how a phase of service-based competition, where an entrant leases
access to an incumbents infrastructure, a¤ects the entrants incentives to invest in an alternative
infrastructure, when it acquires market experience progressively. We have shown that the phase of
service-based competition has two e¤ects on the date of facility-based entry: a replacement e¤ect,
and a stepping stone e¤ect, which is due to the entrants acquisition of experience.
When experience acquisition depends only on the time spent in the market and facility-based
entry is a long-term possibility, the stepping stone e¤ect increases the entrants investment in-
centives, and thus accelerates facility-based entry. However, if facility-based entry is possible in
the short term (due to low investment costs, for example), the stepping stone e¤ect delays the
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entrants investment. The intuition is that the entrant has then incentives to prolong the phase
of service-based competition to acquire more experience. We have then shown that a phase of
service-based competition delays facility-based entry if prospects of facility-based competition are
su¢ciently high, and that it can accelerate facility-based entry if prospects are very weak and
experience acquisition has a strong e¤ect on the entrants prots.
We have also analyzed the case where experience acquisition depends on the entrants customer
base. If facility-based entry is a short-term possibility, we obtain the same result as in our main
model: increasing the access price enhances investment incentives, but at the cost of lower static
e¢ciency. However, if facility-based entry is viable only in the long run, a low access price, which is
pro-competitive, also allows the entrant to acquire experience rapidly, and thus accelerates facility-
based entry.
From a policy perspective, our results suggest that regulators face a trade-o¤ between service-
based and facility-based competition when facility-based entry is possible in the short term. Even
though entrants can acquire experience during the phase of service-based competition, facility-based
entry is delayed. A ne-tuned regulation of the access price (e.g., an access price increasing over
time) is therefore warranted. By contrast, if facility-based entry appears to be viable only in the
long run, a phase of service-based competition with a low access price can e¤ectively serve as a
stepping stone for a new entrant.
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Appendix
Appendix A: Second-order condition without access
Using (4), we nd that
d2naE
dT 2
= 2e T
Z 1
0
e xFE ( (x)) dx  C
00 (T ) .
The rm term is positive or negative. Therefore, naE is concave if C (T ) is su¢ciently convex.
Appendix B: Second-order condition with access
Using (5), we nd that
d2aE
dT 2
= e T

FE ( (T ))  
S
E ( (T ) ; r)

 e T0 (T )

@FE
@
( (T )) 
@SE
@
( (T ) ; r)

 C 00 (T ) .
The rm term is positive under Assumption 2(ii), whereas the second term can be either positive
or negative. Therefore, aE is concave if C (T ) is su¢ciently convex.
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